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On market concentration and international outsourcing
Abstract
We set up a partial equilibrium model of Cournot competition, where firms can strategically choose
their outsourcing intensity. This decision is based on a trade-off between lower marginal production
costs and higher fixed costs. In this model, a lower number of identical firms leads to higher market
concentration and higher outsourcing activities. The theoretical hypothesis of a positive correlation
between market concentration and international outsourcing is confirmed by rank correlation
coefficients and a fixed effects panel data analysis using data on the intermediate goods imports to
output ratio and market concentration in the EU12 countries. In the fixed effects regression analysis we
show that market concentration has to be treated as an endogenous variable to avoid biased and
inconsistent estimates.
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Abstract
We set up a partial equilibrium model of Cournot competition, where Þrms can
strategically choose their outsourcing intensity. This decision is based on a trade-oﬀ
between lower marginal production costs and higher Þxed costs. In this model, a
lower number of identical Þrms leads to higher market concentration and higher
outsourcing activities. The theoretical hypothesis of a positive correlation between
market concentration and international outsourcing is conÞrmed by rank correlation
coeﬃcients and a Þxed eﬀects panel data analysis using data on the intermediate
goods imports to output ratio and market concentration in the EU12 countries. In
the Þxed eﬀects regression analysis we show that market concentration has to be
treated as an endogenous variable to avoid biased and inconsistent estimates.
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1 Introduction
International outsourcing is an essential characteristics of the current globalization wave.
Recent studies point to the relevance of outsourcing and trade in intermediate goods for
the explanation of rising wage inequality in the US. Feenstra and Hanson (2001, p. 1)
stress that trade in intermediate inputs can have an impact on wages and employment
that is much greater than for trade in Þnal consumer goods and Krugman (1995, p. 331)
remarks that it is hard to argue that the sheer volume of trade (...) marks a qualitative
diﬀerence from previous experience. Rather, it is the composition of trade in general and
the share of intermediate inputs in particular that matters (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001,
p. 5). For similar arguments see Feenstra (1998). Hummels et al. (2001) measure vertical
specialization1 as the value of imported inputs embodied in goods that are exported and
Þnd for a sample of 14 economies (10 OECD and four emerging markets countries) that
the vertical specialization share of exports grew by about 30% between 1970 and 1990,
and that growth in the vertical specialization share accounted for 30% of the growth in the
overall export/GDP ratio. For further evidence on the size of global production sharing
see Yeats (2001). All of these Þndings underline the growing importance of international
outsourcing and intermediate input trade in the last few decades.
The theoretical literature on outsourcing (fragmentation of production across borders)
is predominantly organized around the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin, Ricardo and Ricardo-
Viner general equilibrium models of international trade with perfectly competitive goods
markets (compare Arndt, 1997; Deardorﬀ, 2001a, 2001b; Egger, 2002; Egger and Egger,
2001; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2000; Kohler, 2001a, 2001b). There is a consensus that
shrinking trade costs of intermediate goods in a broad sense2 are an important incentive
for outsourcing. In general equilibrium models, industry-speciÞc trade costs, technologies
and factor costs typically explain the diﬀerences in outsourcing activities across industries
(compare the discussion in Egger and Egger, 2001). With a few exceptions, previous
1The terms vertical specialization and international outsourcing are used synonymously. See the
discussion in Hummels et al. (2001) on p. 76.
2... the costs of linking such fragments across borders,... (Kohler, 2001b).
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empirical research mainly focuses on the wage and employment eﬀects of outsourcing
in the developed economies (see Egger and Egger, 2001; Feenstra and Hanson, 1999,
2001; Görg et al., 2001; Greenaway et al., 1999, 2000; Egger and Egger, 2002a, forms an
exception by assessing the impact of international outsourcing on wages in Central and
Eastern Europe).
Previous research on the determinants of outsourcing mainly assesses Þrm-level data.
Girma and Görg (2002) measure outsourcing by the cost of industrial services received
by separate establishments in a panel of UK Þrms in three sectors. They Þnd that high
wage establishments are more prone to using outsourcing. (Girma and Görg, 2002, p.
9). Love and Roper (2001) in a large sample of UK and German manufacturing Þrms
Þnd that locational factors are less important than organizational and strategic ones.
Additionally, and similar to the results of Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) for Belgian
manufacturing Þrms, their results diverge from those of a resource-constrained or market-
structure explanation of outsourcing (Love and Roper, 2001, p. 332).
To the best of our knowledge, international outsourcing at the industry level has so
far not been systematically related to industry measures (for an exception see Görg, 2000,
who analyzes the determinants of outward processing trade). This paper is a Þrst step in
this direction by demonstrating that the observed diﬀerences in the outsourcing engage-
ment across industries may also be due to diﬀerences in market concentration. We take a
partial equilibrium (short-run) point of view and set up a simple model of Cournot com-
petition, where Þrms can strategically choose their outsourcing intensity. This decision is
based on the following trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, outsourcing generates additional costs
in the form of search costs to Þnd a suitable supplier of the imported intermediate good
(compare Grossman and Helpman, 2002), production adjustment costs and communica-
tion and coordination costs.3 These costs depend on the degree of outsourcing. On the
other hand, outsourcing also implies access to cheaper intermediate goods imported from
3Jones (2000, p. 117) stresses the importance of service links. The costs of service links include (...)
costs of communication, and the costs of planning and the coordination to match the quality and quantity
of output ßows.
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abroad.4 Thus, (marginal) production costs (net of search, adjustment, communication
and coordination costs) are declining in the outsourcing intensity.5
In our theoretical model, it turns out that a higher market concentration leads to a
higher outsourcing intensity at the industry level. This result is conÞrmed by the rank
correlation coeﬃcients of market concentration and the outsourcing intensity (intermedi-
ate goods imports as percent of gross production) within the EU12 area. Hence, market
structure is indeed one reason, why outsourcing activities are so diﬀerent across indus-
tries. In a second part of our empirical investigation, we assess the marginal impact of a
change in concentration on outsourcing of the EU12 economies. We Þnd that the observed
change in concentration accounts for a rise in the intra-EU12 outsourcing growth rate by
38 percentage points per annum and for an increase in the growth rate of outsourcing of
the EU12 to the Rest of the World by about 67 percentage points.
2 A Cournot Model With Outsourcing
Consider a model, where a given number of Þrms () sells a homogeneous good under
Cournot competition facing the inverse demand function
 = − , (1)
with  being the aggregate output. Then, proÞts of Þrm  are given by
 = (	− ) 
 − 
¡

¢

 − . (2)
Thereby, 
 is the output of Þrm  and  denotes the degree of international outsourcing
of Þrm  (i.e., the outsourcing intensity). The amount of imported intermediate goods
4It is typically argued in the literature that the driving force behind international outsourcing are
diﬀerences in factor prices. Compare among others Arndt (1997) and Kohler (2001a).
5The idea that international outsourcing has two opposing eﬀects on total (production  coordina-
tion) costs is closely related to the formalization of fragmentation in Burda and Dluhosch (2002a, 2002b).
In their paper, an increase in business services leads, through a fragmentation induced specialization
eﬀect, to a decline in marginal production costs.
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of Þrm  is then given by  
. 

 describes output-independent outsourcing costs (as
for example search, coordination and communication costs), which are increasing in the
outsourcing intensity . Unit production costs, given by  (

), are strictly decreasing
in , with 
0 ()  0 and 
00 ()  0.
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Firms simultaneously choose the output level and the outsourcing intensity (i.e., the
production technology). By assumption the number of Þrms  is such that positive proÞts
  0 are guaranteed. The Þrst order conditions in a symmetric equilibrium with identical
Þrms (suppressing ) can be written as
	−  ()−  (+ 1) 
 = 0 (3)
and
0 () 
 +  = 0. (4)
Using the implicit function theorem in (4), the following impact of the output on the
outsourcing intensity can be derived:



= − 
0 ()
00 () 

 0. (5)
Moreover, use  (
) in (3) to obtain



= − 

 (+ 1) + 0 () 
. (6)
Thus, 

≷ 0 iﬀ  ( + 1) ≶ |0 ()|  . Now, solve (4) for 0 () and use  , according
to (5) to derive



≷ 0 iﬀ [	−  ()] 
 ≶ − 
0 ()
00 ()
. (7)
For an explicit solution, assume  () = , with   0. Then,
0()
00()
gives 1
−1.
Finally, we obtain
[	−  ()] 
  1
1 + || (8)
6The convexity of marginal production costs is motivated by the idea that the cost-saving advantage
of international outsourcing diﬀers accross production processes. By maximizing their proÞts, Þrms
outsource those production processes with the highest cost-saving potential Þrst. The formal assumptions
on Þrst and second derivatives of unit cost function  () only holds for interior solutions (i.e., a positive
amount of outsourcing and home-supplied intermediate inputs).
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and therefore 

 0 from the requirement of positive proÞts. Accordingly,


=






 0. (9)
In a symmetric-Þrm model, market concentration is fully determined by the number of
Þrms, whereas Þrm size does not matter, due to the assumption of equal size. In this
case, market concentration of  Þrms (	) is given by 	 = , which is well-known
from text-book oligopoly models. According to (9), the outsourcing intensity is negatively
related to the number of Þrms and, therefore, positively related to market concentration.7
Firm size does not matter for market concentration. This is a direct consequence of
the symmetry assumption, but may be misplaced from an empirical point of view. In
principle, an industry with 100 Þrms may be more concentrated than an industry with
10 Þrms, if the former is e.g. dominated by one big player. An important question,
therefore, is: How robust is our theoretical hypothesis with respect to the concentration
measure? In Egger and Egger (2002b), we have established a model with two types of Þrms
producing a homogenous good: (identical) large multinational enterprises active in home
and foreign markets and small competitive producers serving only the local market. In
this competitive fringe model multinational enterprises set quantities subject to both the
amount of domestically produced goods and the output level chosen by their multinational
rivals. Market concentration is given by the ratio of output of a single multinational
relative to total market output including that of multinationals and competitive home
producers (in each market). Consider that only multinationals have access to international
outsourcing. Then, similar to the symmetric-Þrm oligopoly model in this paper, market
concentration and international outsourcing are positively related in the competitive fringe
framework in Egger and Egger (2002b). This result holds for comparative static eﬀects (of
tariﬀ changes, changes in the number of active multinationals and home producers, etc.)
as long as the number of markets (in which multinationals are active) is held constant.
The main diﬀerence between the competitive fringe and the symmetric-Þrm oligopoly
7In an emprical investigation Geroski and Mazzucato (2001) have identiÞed a negative relationship
between the number of Þrms and market concentration in the US car market.
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model is that both market concentration and international outsourcing are endogenous
in the former, whereas market concentration is exogenous in the latter set-up (as long as
the number of Þrms is an exogenous variable).
In sum, we think that our theoretical hypothesis derived from the simple symmetric-
Þrm oligopoly model is robust. However, in the empirical analysis we have to take the
possible endogeneity problem of market concentration into account.
3 Empirical Evidence
Our data base contains intermediate goods imports (UNO, Broad Economic Categories)
in terms of gross production (New Cronos, EUROSTAT)8 and market concentration of the
largest Þve Þrms in the EU12 market (Davies and Lyons, 1996; Sleuwaegen and Veugelers,
2001). In our context, we cannot rely on Input-Output tables, since no information is
available at the required industry level. However, we should mention that to some extent
intermediate goods trade data contain re-exports of intermediate goods further processed
abroad. Market concentration measures the share of gross production of the largest Þve
Þrms as a fraction of total industry gross production and is based on data from balance
sheets. We interpolate market concentration, which is only available for 1987, 1993 and
1997, to obtain an estimate for 1990, since this is the earliest year outsourcing data are
available. The data are in an aggregated form of Nace-3-digit, due to the availability of
data on concentration (compare Sleuwaegen and Veugelers, 2001). In sum, we come up
with 66 industries, 11 countries9 and three years (1990, 1993, 1997).
 Tables 1 and 2 
Tables 1 and 2 display descriptive statistics at both the industry and the country
level. On average, international outsourcing relative to gross production of the EU12
8This is a wider measure of outsourcing than outward processing trade as analyzed by Görg (2000).
9The EU15 countries less the joining countries of 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden). Belgium and
Luxembourg are treated as a single economy, due to the availability of trade data.
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economies increased by about 3% in the 90s and it grew faster to non-EU12 economies
than to EU12 members. SpeciÞcally, outsourcing grew fast in the textiles and clothing
industries. The rise in outsourcing was most pronounced in the Southern EU members
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain).10 In a couple of the Western EU12 countries (France,
Portugal, Spain), the surge of outsourcing was dominated by intra-EU12 sourcing of
inputs, whereas in the other economies outsourcing to non-EU12 members grew faster. In
the same period, market concentration rose on average and especially so (as expected) in
the motor vehicles, food, and computer and oﬃce equipment industries. In our sample,
the rise in (gross production weighted) market concentration was most pronounced in
Ireland, Great Britain and France.
In a Þrst step, we compute rank correlation coeﬃcients between the intermediate
goods imports to output ratio as a broad measure of outsourcing and market concen-
tration. Therefore, we calculate averages over the period 1990-97. Table 3 displays the
results for the outsourcing to gross production ratio of EU12 countries to diﬀerent re-
gions. Intermediate goods imports in general as well as from the EU12 area and from
the Rest of the World (ROW) in terms of gross production are positively correlated with
the industry-speciÞc market concentration in the EU12 area as suggested by the model
above.
 Table 3 
The coeﬃcients are relatively small but statistically signiÞcant throughout. However,
to infer the causal relation and to control for other exogenous inßuences, one might be
interested in a regression analysis provided in a second step. In our theoretical model,
we assume that market concentration is an exogenous variable. As mentioned above, this
is only the case, if market concentration is totally determined by the (exogenous) Þrm
number like in a single-sector symmetric-Þrm oligopoly model. If Þrms are not symmetric,
10That international outsourcing behaviour may be quite diﬀerent across industrialized countries is con-
sistent with the Þndings of Campa and Goldberg (1997) that the imported input share of manufacturing
industries in Canada and the United Kingdom are consistently greater than in the United States.
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market concentration also depends on individual Þrm size, so that a potential endogene-
ity problem of market concentration may arise in our empirical analysis. Accordingly, we
present two types of regressions: (i) Þxed eﬀects models, where market concentration is
treated exogenous (Table 4), and (ii) Þxed eﬀects instrumental variable regressions (Ta-
ble 5), where we instrument market concentration by once lagged unit labor costs (New
Cronos, EUROSTAT) and contemporaneous Þnal goods transportation costs proxied by
the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio from trade statistics at the industry level (UNO World Trade Data-
base). In all models, Þxed time eﬀects control for a common trend in the intermediate
goods imports to output ratio, and Þxed industry×country eﬀects account for all unob-
served persistent inßuences speciÞc to each industry (such as economies of scale, Þxed
costs, or typical goods characteristics) and to each country (legal standards or remote-
ness). Additionally, we control for the investment to output ratio measured by the gross
Þxed capital formation as percent of gross production (New Cronos, EUROSTAT) and
the gross expenditures on research and development (R&D) relative to gross production
(ANBERD statistics).
 Tables 4 and 5 
In the Þxed eﬀects models of Table 4, no signiÞcant impact of market concentration
can be identiÞed. However, the instrumental variable regression results in Table 5 indicate
that international outsourcing positively depends on market concentration. By and large,
this Þnding of the importance of market structure at the industry level of the EU12
countries squares with Þrm-level evidence for selected economies (see Love and Roper,
2001). As reßected by the Hausman (1978) test statistics, the exogeneity of market
concentration is rejected at convenient levels of signiÞcance and the results in Table 4
are obviously prone to an endogeneity problem. The Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)
over-identiÞcation tests do not cast doubt on the appropriateness of our instruments, and
the F-statistics from the Þrst-stage regressions show that the instruments are relevant.
Especially, this suggests that unit labor costs are uncorrelated with the error term in
the second stage regression. This is important, since Girma and Görg (2002) identify a
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signiÞcant impact of wage costs on outsourcing for UK establishment data. Noteworthy,
we lose a lot of observations due to missing R&D and gross Þxed capital formation data,
but these variables do not enter signiÞcantly (the latter squares with Þrm-level evidence
by Love and Roper, 2001, for German and UK manufacturing Þrms). Therefore, we
additionally estimate three parsimonious instrumental variable models, where we restrict
the inßuence of both the investment to output ratio and the R&D to output ratio to be
zero (see Table 6).
 Table 6 
The parsimonious models explain more than 80% of the variation in EU12-wide out-
sourcing, irrespective of whether overall, intra-EU12 or Rest-of-the-World outsourcing is
considered and the number of available observations doubles as compared to Tables 4
and 5. Again, we Þnd a signiÞcant positive marginal impact of market concentration on
international outsourcing of the EU12 countries.
With the regression results at hand, we can assess the size of the impact of the ob-
served change in market concentration on outsourcing over the period 1990-97. Therefore,
we focus on the following thought experiment. Assume that market concentration did not
change since 1990. Then, the diﬀerence between the model prediction, assuming that mar-
ket concentration has developed as observed, and the zero concentration change prediction
(counterfactual) is an estimate of the purely concentration-induced change in outsourc-
ing. According to our estimation results for intra-EU12 outsourcing (EU12) and EU12
outsourcing to the Rest of the World (RoW) in Table 6,11 the observed increase in
market concentration between 1990 and 1997 has fostered international outsourcing of
the EU12 economies to both their EU partner countries and the RoW. The rise in market
concentration accounts for a diﬀerence in the predicted and the counterfactual growth in
intra-EU outsourcing by about 38 percentage points per annum, which is about 10% of
11The poolability of intra-EU12 outsourcing and RoW outsourcing is rejected at convenient levels of
signiÞcance. Accordingly, we do not base our thought experiment on overall outsourcing of the EU12 as
in the Þrst data column of Table 2.
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the predicted annual growth. We should bear in mind that the level of integration of the
RoW with the EU is relatively low (i.e., the EU is relatively closed as a whole). Therefore,
the impact of the change in the EU12 market concentration on outsourcing to the RoW
is more pronounced and accounts for an average annual growth rate of the intermediate
goods imports to output ratio by about 67 percentage points, which is about 20% of the
predicted annual growth.
4 Conclusions
This paper takes a partial equilibrium Cournot competition perspective and looks at the
relationship between market concentration and the outsourcing intensity at the industry
level. In this model, market concentration is positively related to international outsourc-
ing. This theoretical hypothesis complements the insights from the previous literature on
outsourcing. Market concentration may be seen as an important source of the diﬀerence
in outsourcing activities across industries.
We provide evidence that the intermediate goods import intensity of EU12 countries
and market concentration in the EU12 market are positively correlated, which conÞrms
our theoretical priors. In a Þxed eﬀects regression analysis, we illustrate that (i) market
concentration is endogenous and (ii) the observed dynamics in market concentration in
66 industries of the average EU12 country have accounted for a considerable rise in the
growth rate of outsourcing to both other EU12 economies and the Rest of the World.
On average, the change in market concentration accounts for about 20% of the predicted
annual growth in international outsourcing to the RoW of the typical EU12 economy and
industry.
The positive relationship between international outsourcing and market concentration
implies that adverse eﬀects of entry deterrence may be lower if international outsourcing
is an important characteristic of a sector. This may be important for the optimal com-
petition and regulation policy in a single country as well as in a regional trading block
like the European Union. Easier market entry, on the one hand, means that the degree
11
of competition increases typically resulting in positive welfare eﬀects. On the other hand,
a higher number of active Þrms leads to lower international outsourcing activities giving
rise to a lower performance of the industry in terms of production costs eﬃciency. Of
course, any negative factor market eﬀects, which are often put forward in the political
and scientiÞc discussion on the macroeconomic consequences of international outsourcing,
are not considered in this assessment.
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Table 1 - Descritptive Statistics at the Industry Level
Gross Production Weighted Average Annual Change in Percent (1990-97)
World EU12 RoW
First processing of steel 5,34 4,43 7,93 8,44
Steel tubes 1,77 -0,10 6,48 62,90
Non-ferrous metals 2,89 2,99 2,78 0,24
Clay products 4,67 2,00 21,46 9,46
Cement, lime and plaster 5,79 2,60 13,98 11,77
Concrete -3,87 -3,77 -4,37 -0,09
Glass 2,75 1,48 6,92 11,12
Ceramics 4,15 2,39 13,85 -4,92
Basic chemicals 2,02 1,86 2,40 -1,25
Paint and ink 2,33 2,07 3,45 2,86
Pharmaceuticals 1,30 -0,12 4,09 0,58
Soap, detergents and toiletries 5,10 4,70 6,33 7,76
Man-made fibres 0,74 -0,54 3,77 10,74
Casting, forging and first treatment of metal 2,43 0,86 6,81 -12,38
Manufacture of metal products 3,30 0,14 10,48 -10,22
Manufacture of tractors and agricultural machinery 4,17 0,91 12,45 15,93
Manufacture of machine tools for working metal 4,03 0,42 9,33 -8,00
Manufacture of other machinery 4,50 3,87 5,80 -8,03
Computer and office equipment 2,95 2,46 3,43 27,82
Insulated wires and cables 8,89 8,09 10,07 34,51
Manufacture of electrical machinery 5,79 3,73 9,00 -4,94
Batteries and accumulators 10,73 6,36 15,48 4,50
Electronic valves, tubes and other components 3,72 5,78 2,19 9,22
Television and radio transmitters -3,26 -6,67 -0,15 9,22
Television and radio receivers, sound of video recording apparatus 4,52 2,46 5,90 9,22
Measuring, checking and testing instruments 2,51 2,35 2,69 9,22
Domestic electrcal appliances 4,33 2,82 7,73 11,23
Lighting equipment and lamps 6,62 2,35 20,79 21,29
Motor vehicles 4,84 3,45 6,94 19,28
Motor vehicle parts 1,17 0,17 4,42 2,88
Railway locomotives and stock 6,14 3,98 12,79 22,39
Cycles and motorcycles 6,81 4,83 8,50 13,73
Aerospace 0,49 -2,11 2,29 15,94
Measuring, checking and precision instruments 2,51 2,35 2,69 -8,30
Medical instruments 2,64 1,24 4,22 8,59
Optical instruments 3,35 5,63 1,71 13,80
Oils and fats 5,72 8,10 3,23 22,13
Meat products -4,14 -3,13 -6,77 -10,42
Dairy products 3,69 2,84 16,79 -1,75
Fruit and vegetables 1,93 1,03 2,61 -4,81
Fish products 0,11 -0,63 0,43 -6,55
Grain milling and manufacture of starch 2,85 2,56 5,31 0,91
Pasta -1,71 2,45 -4,21 20,84
Bread and biscuits -1,71 2,45 -4,21 -1,39
Sugar -1,71 2,45 -4,21 45,83
Confectionary and ice cream -1,71 2,45 -4,21 4,02
Animal feed 14,91 3,98 50,38 1,07
Other foods -1,71 2,45 -4,21 8,12
Alcohol, spirits, wine and cider 2,73 3,05 -0,19 1,99
Beer 2,73 3,05 -0,19 62,49
Softdrinks and waters 2,73 3,05 -0,19 -2,90
Textiles 4,04 2,49 6,98 -10,50
Knitwear 12,76 8,92 22,88 -4,96
Leather 6,44 5,62 7,25 -6,04
Clothing -2,14 6,11 -3,95 -11,39
Made-up textiles 3,72 2,54 6,38 -11,39
Wood sawing -1,06 -2,42 -0,82 -11,55
Wood boards -2,78 -2,47 -3,01 1,07
Wooden building structures 6,16 -0,18 13,35 -11,73
Wooden containers 6,96 5,65 9,32 -11,73
Wooden furniture 8,75 6,35 12,47 -8,41
Paper and pulp 1,65 2,44 1,14 -0,73
Articles of paper 2,48 2,13 3,31 -4,84
Publishing -0,77 -2,64 5,09 -8,67
Plastics 2,23 1,49 4,68 -11,58
Musical instruments 5,45 1,02 8,53 18,62
Average 3,15 2,28 4,67 2,16
Industry 
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